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POLITICS AND SOCIETY:
TIlE POPULAR RESPONSE TO POLITICAL RHETORIC
IN TEXAS, 1857·1860

by Billy D. Ledbetter
From 1857 to 1860 fire~eating secessionist rhetoric dominated Texas
politics and helped prepare the way for disunion. Rather than representing an
organized or planned conspiracy, the political rhetoric was part ofa spontaneous
movement to perpetuate the institution of slavery. This movement was
supported by most of the regular Democratic party members, who were steeped
in the states' rights philosophy of government. Their task was to present a
united front to the North, forcing the election ofanother pro-southern President;
if they failed to elect their candidate, the rhetoric of secession would have prepared the way for disunion. Focusing on three significant elections, this paper
illustrates that the people listened to and were influenced by political rhetoric,
but only when it reflected already established beliefs.
Inthe state elections of 1857, Texans seemed to be listening to the rhetoric
of the states rightists and extremists. Strong in their memories were the national
elections of 1856 when Black Republicans had made good showings in the
national congressional elections and had threatened to elect a President. The
Republican menace on the national scene strengthened the Democratic party in
the state. Although it had been loosely organized, the state Democratic party
had, since the beginning of political parties in Texas, been dominated by states'
rightists who justified secession and made it clear that they would not hesitate to
resort to it as a remedy. In 1857, the party held its first fully organized and
representative state political convention for the purpose of nominating a
gubernatorial candidate. The nomination went to Hardin Runnels, who had long
expressed his states' rights philosophy of government as a member and later
speaker of the Texas House of Representatives. His running mate was Francis
R. Lubbock, a long-time supporter of the regular Democratic party and holder
of numerous minor state offices. His approach to government made him
compatible with Runnels to round out the radical ticket. Campaigning on the
party's past stand, Runnels was a southern extremist. l
Opposing Runnels as an independent was Sam Houston, who always
placed the Union above slavery and secession. Having taken an unpopular stand
against such measures as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Houston knew that the
regular Democratic party, which firmly controlled the state legislature, would
never return him to the United States Senate when his term expired in March
1859. Jesse Grimes, running on the independent ticket with Houston, opposed
Lubbock for the lieutenant governor's office. Houston campaigned vigorously,
making over sixty speeches across the state to justify and explain his pro- Union
stand. Although Houston was a well known military hero, he was soundly
defeated by a vote of 32,522 to 23,628. Lubbock also defeated Grimes, chalking
up even larger margins than Runnels. 2
In elections to the national Congress two regular Democratic candidates
were also chosen to represent Texas. In the eastern congressional district John
H. Reagan, district judge from Palestine, who was later Postmaster General in
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Jefferson Davis' cabinet, received the regular party nomination on May 13, at
Tyler. His opponent, a Houston supporter, incumbent Lemuel D. Evans, was
running as an independent while professing to be a Union Democrat and
receiving the support of the Know-Nothing party. Evans attacked Reagan, at
times unfairly, for being a disunionist because of his states' rights, regular
Democratic nomination and support. On occasion Reagan's reactions made him
appear to be somewhat more radical than he actually was. Generally. Reagan's

rhetoric was more moderate than that of his Democratic friends. While he
defended the right of secession, he urged preservation of the Union as long as
possible. In the campaign Evans' alleged Know-Nothing affiliation, as well as
his adamant stand for the Union, proved detrimental, while Reagan's united
Democratic support helped insure him victory in the bitterly fought contest. 3
In the western congressional district, Guy M. Bryan, of Brazoria, received
the regular Democratic nomination at Waco. Having served numerous terms in
the state legislature, he had shown himself to be one of the most radical states'
rights men in the state. He had no organized opposition and won with few votes
being cast against him. The regular Democratic party also fielded a complete list
of state house and senate candidates and won most of the seats against scattered
independent opposition. Thus, by a virtual landslide, the regular Democmtic
party dominated every facet of Texas politics. 4
Almost every newspaper in Texas supported the states' rights candidates.
According to the Marshall Texas Republican, twenty-eight papers supported
Runnels, nine supported Houston, and a few were undecided. Even the Austin
Southern Inlelligencer, which became Houston's major supporter two years
later when he again ran for the governor's office, went on record in support of aII
Democratic party nominees and urged its readers to support Runnels rather than
Houston. Numerous influential individuals such as Bryan, Reagan, and Anson
Jones, ex-president of the Republic of Texas, also denounced Houston. The
rhetoric of the campaign against Houston and similar unionists urged that the
political tactic of cooperating with the North would only destroy states' rights
and nltimately endanger slavery. In 1857, the people of Texas believed that the
regular Democratic party best served their interests. 5
On December21, 1857, Elisha M. Pease, governor of Texas 1853-1857, was
replaced by Runnels. Pease had done all in his power to maintain good relations
between the state and the national government and to quiet anti- Union
sentiment in the state. However, the Democratic party interpreted the election
of 1857 as a mandate to take an extreme stand and Runnels' course differed from
that of Pease. He issued ultimatums to the national government and threatened
secession ifhis demands were not met. Throughout his administration he made it
clear that he would not hesitate to lead the state out of the Union if he believed
that the institution of slavery was being threatened. Few southerners expressed
extremist demands on the Kansas question more loudly or with greater
determination than Governor Runnels. In his inaugral address, he demanded
that Kansas be admitted as a slave state and warned that if this demand was not
met the South would be justified in seceding from the Union. On January 20,
1858, he delivered a message concerned entirely with the admission of Kansas,
in which he predicted that if the North refused to admit Kansas with its slave
constitution, "the time will have come when the Southern states should look to
themselves for the means of maintaining their future security. Then the Texas
state legislature began to set up the machinery for secession. It empowered the
governor to call an election of delegates to a slave state convention; or if Texas
11
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needed to act alone, the governor could convene the legislature to call a special
state convention, Following the lead of Runnels, newspapers and prominent
political figures openly talked of disunion, usually not as an immediate course of
action, but rather as an alternative if the South lost control of the national
government as it would if a Black Republican were ever elected to the
presidency.6

During Runnels' administration the rhetoric and actions of political leaders
and of Texas newspapers became too extreme for most Texans and a
conservative reaction developed among the people. Runnels and his party
moved too fast for the people, resulting in defeat in 1859. Especially important in
alarming the people of the state was the party's attitude toward the reopening of
the African slave trade. In November 1857, after Runnels' election but before
his inaugural, John Henry Brown, the representative from Galveston who was
later editor of the Belton Democrat, introduced into the state house of
representatives a resolution to petition the United States Congress to reopen the
slave trade. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Slaves and
Slavery, which was chaired by Brown. The committee returned its report a
month later, after the inaugural of Runnels. Although most of the committee
members personally favored reopening the African slave trade, the report
recommended that no petition be sent to Congress making such a demand. Their
reasoning was that to renew the controversy would cause adverse reaction from
the North. Opposing agitation to open the trade for practical, not humane or
moral reasons, the committee ordered 10,000 copies of the report published for
distribution across the state. 7
Although the state legislature did not approve petitioning Congress to
re-open the slave trade, the more radical and less compromising element ofthe
party continued the agitation, in spite of the trouble that it might cause. During
the following year, Texas newspapers intensified the demand for re-opening the
trade. To those who believed "that slavery is both just and expedient, and that it
is in accordance with divine law, and that it is a moral, social, and political
blessing," wrote John Marshall, editor of the State Gazette, the slave trade
could not be wrong. The Galveston Weekly News contended that "slavery and
the slave trade stand on precisely the same basis, and that the same arguments
that condemn the latter will equally condemn the former. . . . The admission
that the slave trade, when properly conducted, is a moral evil, is fatal to the
institution of slavery itself." Contending that the Negro was better off as a slave
in the Christian South than in the wilds of Africa, these agitators seemed
determined to make the North accept even this ugliest phase of the institution. 8
Agitation to reopen the African slave trade played a vital role in the election
of1859. From May 2 through May 5,1859, the state Democratic convention met
in Houston to adopt a platform and nominate candidates for the upcoming state
elections_ In this convention, agitation to reopen the slave trade reached its peak

with the attempt of the radicals to make it a part of the party platform. After
much discussion, the party rejected a resolution to reopen the African slave
Irade by the large majority of 228 to 81. Although many party delegates wanted
to reopen the trade, they realized by this time that their demands would only
cause trouble for the South and weaken the party's position in the state, since
public opinion opposed needless agitation. Even Louis T. Wigfall, Texas' most
vocal advocate of disunion and soon to be United State Senator, opposed slave
trade agitation at this time, though he had openly supported the trade. Thus, the
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party did not officially take a stand in favor of the slave trade, but Texans knew
that many party members had favored it. Runnels had supported the movement,
and Texans had connected the agitation with the party. 9
Were the people of Texas listening to the rhetoric of Union or disunion'!
This was the questaD to be answered in the gubernatorial election of 1859.
Hardin Runnels and Francis Lubbock were again the candidates of the state
Democratic party. Opposing them was Sam HOllston, running as an

independent again, with Edward Clark as his running mate. In announcing his
candidacy, Houston said, "The Constitution and the Union embrace the
principles by which I will be governed if elected. They comprehend all the old
Jacksonian National Democracy I ever professed or officially practised."
Creating needless agitation, Runnels openly defended the right of secession, and
many Texans feared that he might lead the state out of the Union. As the issues
were clear to the voters of Texas, Houston refused to campaign actively, making
only one speech in 1859, whereas he had made over sixty two years before. That
he stood strongly for the Union and that Runnels did not was made clear without
extensive campaign rhetoric. 1 ()
Except for Houston's refusal to campaign, the election preparation
resembled that of 1857, with most newspapers supporting the Democratic
ticket. Runnels received support from the most prominent newspapers, among
them the Dallas Herald, Austin Texas State Gazette, Marshall Texas
Republican, and Clarksville Northern Standard. The two major supporters of
Houston, the Marshall Harrison Flag and the Austin Southern Intelligencer,
both were overshadowed in their respective cities by a major press supporting
the Democratic ticket. Thus most of the rhetoric Texans were exposed to in this
election was that of the extrell1e states' rightists, the rhetoric that seemed to
justify and threaten secession. 1 I
Even before the election, several prominent Texans noticed a conservative
reaction to the party's radicalism. Soon after the Democratic convention, but
before Houston announced his candidacy, Elisha M. Pease speculated that if
Houston chose to run he would win with ease. The ex-governor contended that

more than three-fourths ofthe people ofTexas did not believe that the delegates
in Houston supported their best interests, especially with regard to the African
slave trade. Agreeing with Pease, Ferdinand Flake, editor of the Galveston
German newspaper Die Union, perceived that the dominant forces in the
Democratic party were not representative of the Texas people. He further
contended that the delegates meeting in Houston actually did want to reopen the
African slave trade and that their candidates were too radical to adhere to their
adopted platform. Nor were Texans fooled by the convention, observed Flake.
speculating that the people recognized the radicalism of the Democrats and that
any good candidate could beat their nominee. To the people of Texas, claimed
the Southern Intelligencer, Runnels and his party supported "the African slave
trade, secession, and disunion." and Houston opposed all three. 12
Although thousands of Texans had to change their decision of 1857, their
choice was clear and the victory and easy one for Houston. The Old Warrior,
who had lost the election in 1857 by almost 9,000 votes won in 1859by almost the
same number, the final count being 36,227 to 27,500. Edward Clark won over
Lubbock by a small margin. The election had revolved around the issue of
Union versus disunion. the voters ofTexas chose Houston and the Union. 13 His
victory cannot be attributed to his popularity in the state nor to his reputation as
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a military hero since he was overwhelmingly defeated just two years before.
Neither can his victory be explained in terms of voter response to political
rhetoric since most newspapers and influential political1eaders and supported
Runnels. Voters had, in fact, responded adversely to the political rhetoric of
extremism.
Not only did the disunionist element in the state suffer severe losses with
the victories of Houston and Clark, but its candidates for both congressional
districts in 1859 were also defeated. General T, N. Waul, a lawyer of distinction
from the southwestern part of the state and a strong states' rights advocate,
received the western district nomination at a convention also held in Houston.
His opponent was an independent, Andrew J. Hamilton, ex-attorney general
and state legislator, who was provisional governor of Texas immediately after
the Civil War. As a strong Union man, he opposed the ultra Democratic party
for the same reasons that Houston did, and the two men complemented and
supported each other in the election. 14
The Democratic congressional nomination for the eastern district was held
in Henderson on May 2. Incumbent John Reagan announced for reelection prior
to the convention, and the party had little choice but to nominate him, since he
was likely to win with or without their blessings. By this time Reagan had
become unacceptable to many Democrats, especially the extreme states'
rightists. He had published a circular letter stating that he was totally opposed to
reopening the African slave trade and to any wild schemes undertaken to expand
slavery to promote southern interests. As opposed to the fire-eaters of the state
as he was to the abolitionists of the North, he contended that he was first a Union
man, who would do all in his power to prevent secession, as long as the North did
not deny the South its constitutional rights, He realized that extreme measures
on either side, the North or the South, could tear the nation apart. Although
Reagan had been elected in 1857 with party support, this time his nomination
caused a split in Democratic ranks. Because of Reagan's pro-Union policies, a
number of radical states' rightists from the eastern part of the state bolted the
convention and nominated Judge William B. Ochiltree, of Nacogdoches. He
was a former Whig and had been briefly associated with the Know Nothing
party, but by 1859, he was a staunch states' rightist and a well established
member of the radical wing of the party. When the election results were in, both
Hamilton and Reagan were victorious, largely because of their strong Union
stand; in these elections, too, the rhetoric of disunion had failed. Most Texans
believed in the right of secession, but until slavery was really threatened they
would not attempt it, and no amount of political rhetoric could remold their way
of thinking. 15
Smarting from the Unionist victories in the August elections. the
Democratic party, whose members still controlled the state legislature, were
determined to even the score with their opponents. The best retaliation seemed
to be to elect the most radical candidate available to the United States Senate
seat which had to be filled When the legislature met in the fall. Louis T. Wigfall
was the obvious choice: he had long served the radicals and his election would
show the nation where the sentiments of the Texas Democrats lay. His
newspaper support-especially from the Dallas Herald and the Marhsall Texas
Republican - was strong, and he had no strong, organized opposition. Backed
by a Democratic party caucus, he was elected by a narrow margin after a bitter
fight on December 5, 1859. His election was hailed as a mighty victory by the
Democratic party and by most important newspapers across the state.
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Nevertheless, the radical's election did not indicate that majority sentiment in
the state had shifted." Throughout 1859 and early 1860, most Texans probably
still approved of Houston, whose rhetoric remained consistently pro· Union.
But later in 1860 national events changed their position; during the presidential
campaign and election of that year secession rhetoric began to appeal to the

masses.
Since Texans had already decided that they could not remain a part of a
union controlled by an anti-slavery president, election of a pro-southern man
seemed essential in 1860 to avoid southern secession. As time for the national

Democratic nominating convention drew near, Texans were as determined as
any other southern Democrats to force the nomination of a candidate with
southern sentiments, hoping that enough northern Democrats would support
him to win the election. The state Democratic convention remained in the hands
Qfthe strong states' rightist element, who had still not recovered from their past
August defeat and were more adamant than ever in pro-southern demands. The
unionist sentiment was not adequately represented, and the states' rightists
were enthusiastic about their chances to redeem their recent defeat. 17
The Democratic state convention assembled at noon on April 2 and
remained in session until the fifth of the month. Since this was an even numbered
year, only the attorney general, comptroller, and treasurer would be nominated
for state offices; but it was the most important convention to date. Apart from
the regular nominations and general party business, the delegates had to adopt a
platform and choose delegates to the national Democratic convention, which
was to meet in Charleston three weeks later. The rhetoric of John Marshall,
chairman ofthe state convention, who addressed the convention on the opening
day, set the tone for the meeting. He believed that the Black Republican party
desired to destroy the institution of slavery and pleaded for the slaveholding
states to present a united front to prevent this possibility. The South, he
contended, must make its demands clear and stand by them. Having served in
1857 as the president of the Texas state Democratic centml committee and
since 1858 as chairman of the Democratic state convention, Marshall was one
of the party's leading policy makers and one of the most radical men in the
state. IS
After making nominations for state officers, the delegates got down to the
serious business of adopting a platform, choosing delegates to the Charleston
convention, and choosing the Democratic electors for the presidential election.
The rhetoric of the platform, as well as of the party leaders, was more radical
than it had been in the presidential election of 1856. The earlier convention had
adopted the Cincinnati Platform, insisting that the national government had no
right to interfere with slavery in the territories, but the platform of 1860 went
further. Although it still upheld the Cincinnati Platform, it now interpreted that
platform to mean that the national government's duty was to protect slavery in
the territories. Texas Democratis made a explicit denial of the popular
sovereignty interpretation in their platform, making it clear that Texans would
not compromise with northern Democrats. 19
The rhetoric of the party convention also prepared the way for secession.
Its platform asserted that a state, expecially Texas, which had been a sovereign
nation prior to annexation, had the right to secede from the Union whenever it
believed that its constitutional rights were being violated. According to the
Democrats, since Texas had joined the Union voluntarily and peacefully,
parting "with no portion of her sovereignty, but merely chang[ing] the agent
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through whom she should exercise some of the powers appertaining to it," the
state could leave the Union and resume its position as a sovereign nation. The
platform also expressed Texans' fear of the Black Republicans, urging that if a
Republican were elected President, Texas should meet with her sister
slaveholding states and decide what action should be taken. 20

The wording of the last part of the platform was the rhetoric of racism, with
which most white Texans were much in tune. It reiterated Texans' belief in the
supremacy of the white race over the black and contended that slavery was the
only means of continuing harmonious race relations. Fear of the Republican
party stemmed from Texans' belief that it would destroy this relationship.
We regard any effort by the Black Republican party to disturb the
happily existing subordinate condition oUhe negro race in the South, as
violative of the organic act guaranteeing the supremacy of the white
race, and any political action which proposes to invest negroes with
equal, social, and political equality with the white race, as an infraction
of those wise and wholesome distinctions of nature, which all
experience teaches, were established to ensure the prosperity and
happiness of each race.
Any effort to elevate the Negro race WOUld, they believed, merely degrade the
white race. The government was designed to benefit the Caucasian race, and
slavery' 'constitutes the only true, natural and harmonious relationship in which
the otherwise antagonistic races can live together. "21
After the platform had been approved, the convention nominated eight
delegates to the national Democratic convention, which was to convene on
April 23, 1860. These eight delegates were more radical than the average Texan,
being among the most staunch states' rightists in the party. The four delegates
chosen from the eastern congressional district were Hardin Runnels, Elkanah
Greer, F. F. Foscue, and Richard B. Hubbard. The delegate$ from the western
congressional district were Francis R. Lubbock, Guy M. Bryan. Fletcher F.
Stockdale, and Joseph F. Crosby. Most of these men were prominent political
figures in the state, leaders in the secession movement. and later staunch
supporters of the Confederacy. 22
Once in Charleston. these delegates witnessed the breakup of the
Democratic party. Southerners demanded a platform guaranteeing that
Congress would protect slavery in the territories. When this demand was not
met, most of them bolted from the convention, including all of the Texas
delegates. Those remaining adjourned without nominating a candidate, but
agreed to reconvene in Baltimore on June 18. The northern Democrats were
determined to nominate Stephen Douglas and adopt. a popular sovereignty
platform, while southern Democrats were determined to accept neither him nor
his platform. Reconvening in Baltimore failed to help the southern cause, as
again most of the southern delegates left the convention. This time, however,
the northern delegates nominated Douglas and adopted his platform. The
southern delegates met, adopted the Alabama platform which would guarantee
slavery in the territories, and nominated John C. Breckinridge as their standard
bearer. The Constitutional Union party was organized and nominated John Bell,
but it only further split the Democratic vote. With the breakup of the
Democratic party, the Republicans were virtually assured of the presidential
victory in IS60. 2;)
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Texans overwhelmingly supported the action of their delegates in
Charleston and Baltimore. Even before the Charleston convention, several
county conventions had urged the delegates to demand a pro-slavery candidate
and a platform that would guarantee the expansion of slavery and to refuse
acceptance of Douglas and the popular sovereignty platform. After Charleston,
most newspapers supported the bolt and insisted that the delegates stand by
their position. Then after Baltimore countless mass meetings, newspapers, and
states' rights politicians overwhelmingly supported the delegates and praised
them for leaving the convention. 24
For the first time since the election of 1857, the rank and file in Texas turned
back to the state Democratic party for leadership, listening carefully to their
rhetoric as the crisis approached. Since Texans believed that Douglas' squatter
sovereignty platform would have the same effect in limiting slavery as thatofthe
Black Republicans, they overwhelmingly supported the sou them branch of the
party. Thus the radical states' rightists, who had long indicated that they had no
opposition to disunion, began to attract a large following in the state. Rhetoric
that had been too radical the year before now seemedjustified. The real crisis lay
just around the comer, and Texans began preparing for the election of a Black
Republican. 25
In Texas the campaign during the summer of 1860 was not really an attempt
to elect a President but rather to show the North where the sentiments of the
state lay. The Breckinridge forces, who had an overwhelming majority in the
state from the very first, realized that their nominee could not be elected as long
as the field was occupied by four candidates; but they believed that they should
show the North that Texans were united on the southern Democratic platform
and would leave the Union if slavery were not guaranteed in the territories. The
forces supporting Bell also realized that their candidate had no chance unless the
number of candidates was reduced, but they wished to show the nation that they
were willing to compromise, or at least delay a showdown on the slavery issue,
since their platform was nomcommittal. The campaign picture in Texas was
somewhat confused by the nomination of Houston as a second Union candidate
with the hope that all anti-Lincoln candidates would withdraw and support him.
However, Houston withdrew his name from consideration in August. 26
As the election drew near and the victory of a Black Republican seemed
inevitable, almost everyone stressed the right of secession. Generally, the
Breckinridge supporters took the position that secession was a right that should
be exercised if Lincoln were elected; threats of secession marked their campaign
rhetoric. The Bell men, along with the small number of Douglas followers,
generally defended the right of secession, but argued that Lincoln's election was
not ample justification to exercise that right. Since Lincoln had said that he
would not interfere with slavery where it existed, these people would wait for an
"overt act"' against the institution. The campaign and the election proved that
the vast majority of Texans, regardless of their political affiliation, at least
believed in the abstract right of secession. 27
For many years, Texans had accepted secession as a suitable alternative if
it ever became necessary to preserve their institution of slavery _This attitude
had not been sold to the people by political rhetoric; the rhetoric probably
reinforced their beliefs, but it was their overwhelming support for slavery that
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led them into secession. In 1860, even before presidential nominations had been
made, the Galveston Civilian and Gazette summed up Texans' sentiments
when it stated:
We have uniformly opposed, and still oppose secession and disunion in
any shape, under past or existing circumstances, but we have never
denied that right to resort to these desperate remedies. The right of
revolution, by whatever name it is called, is inherent and inalienable. To
declare its existance does not strengthen it; and to deny it does not
destroy it. 28
Even strong unionists, for the most part, felt that secession under certain
conditions was justified. Shortly before the election of 1860, William E. Burnet
wrote his father, ex-president of the Republic, "A dissolution of the Union is, to
my mind, the greatest evil that can befall this country; and nothing short ofactual

and continued oppression by one pnrtion of Ihe counlry over the olher can
justify it." John Reagan, whose election to the House of Representatives the
previous year was hailed across the nation as a victory for the Union, believed
that if Lincoln were elected the South should adopt' 'such a course as will secure
out rights, in the Union, if we can, but out of it if we must." Texans generally
favored both slavery and the Union, but were quick to choose the former over
the latter. 29
With even moderates and unionists defending the right of secession, the
radicals loudly, frequently, and openly advocated disunion. Louis T. Wigfall
actually looked forward to secession if the southern concept of constitutional
rights was violated. He contended that he would mther see the nation "blown
into as many fragments and particles as gunpowder could scatter a glass vase,"
than see the South denied its domestic institutions. Across the state men like
William S. Oldham, who was later chosen to the Confederate Senate along with
Wigfall, did all in their power to destory the effects of Houston's anti· secession
speeches. Oldham, campaigning for Breckinridge, told his audiences that "The
people of each state compose a political community effectively and efficiently
commanded and controlled by the people. The people of any state. having the
right to choose their own destiny, could secede anytime that they felt their
constitutional rights had been violated." Guy M. Bryan told his listeners at a
Democratic meeting that if Lincoln were elected he would' 'visit every county
and speak from every stump in the state to counsel people not to submit but to
dissolve the Union." As Texas newspapers printed numerous editorials
defending the right of secession, the major issue that the campaign of 1860
presented to Texans involved deciding what action they should take if Lincoln
were elected. Again the issue was one of Union or disunion. If Lincoln were
elected the people believed that their greatest fear-emancipation of
slaves-would become a reality. As they faced the possibility of abolition,
Texans made it clear that they would secede rather than allow an abolitionist to
take office. 30
Naturally, the Democratic party press in Texas staunchly supported the
southern Democratic candidate, Breckinridge. Such influential papers as the
Austin Texas State Gazette, Galveston Weekly News, San Antonio Herald,
Marshall Texas Republican, and Clarksville Northern Standard all carried
Breckinridge as their candidate. In addition, a large majority ofall newspapers in
the state supported the southern Democratic candidate. Attempting to convince
Texans that "The Black Republican party are [sic] working for sectional
supremacy, and the extinction of slavery," these papers argued that the South
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must support Breckinridge to show the North that it would not accept such a
party's elevation to the presidency. There was never any doubt that he would
carry the state, and by the last couple of months of the campaign, there was no
doubt that he would not win the presidency; but Texans were urged to vote for
the southern candidate to prove their support of slavery and southern rights.
Immediately prior to the election, the Breckinridge organs were admitting
defeat, but rhetorically pleading for votes to indicate the feelings of the state.
In addition to their strong newspaper ~upport, the Brcckinridge forces held
mass meetings, gave barbecues, and staged public debates in which the rhetoric
of secession prevailed. As early as July, Wigfall, while campaigning for
Breckinridge in the northwestern part of the state, pointed out that neither Bell
nor Douglas could possibly be elected, nor could Breckinridge without northern
support, which he was not likely to get. Wigfall's only hope was that a near
unanimous front in the South for Breckinridge combined wilh threat of secession
might draw the northern conservatives into his camp to keep the South from
leaving the Union. However, he had little real faith that this would happen; the
real purpose of his campaign rhetoric was to convince Texans of the need for
secession,32
Supporting Breckinridge and demanding secession if their candidate failed
to be elected, the Texas Democratic party increased its support and political
rhetoric as the election. approached, lessening the possibility that Bell might
even make a respectable showing. In Texas, the anti-Breckinridge forces
actually had less chance of defeating the southern Democrat than in any other
state in the South. Realizing that their chances were slim, the unionists
attempted to form a fusion ticket which would allow electors to cast votes for the
candidate most likely to defeat Lincoln, but the movement got little support.
When the votes came in on November 6, 1860,47,584 Texans had voted for
Breckinridge and only 15,438 for the fusion ticket, giving Breckinridge over 75
per cent of the votes cast, a considerably larger percentage than he received in
any other state. Nationwide, Lincoln received 180 electoral votes, 28 more than
were necessary for election. With support coming entirely from the free states,
he was to become leader of the nation on March 4, 1861. 33
The die was cast; after the election of Lincoln there was no doubt that Texas
would leave the Union. The secessionists had to circumvent the unionist
governor, Houston, but with the support of the people, this was accomplished,
and a specially elected convention passed a secession ordinance. which the
people of Texas approved by a three to one majority. The rhetoric of secession
had not changed significantly as the crisis of 1860 drew near, but the attitudes of
the people had. Therefore, the rhetoric does not seem to have been the decisive
factor in Texans' determination to leave the Union. Texans listened to the
political rhetoric only when it expressed their sentiments, as the elections of
1859 clearly indicate. But now an overwhelming majority agreed with the
radicals, not because their rhetoric was convincing, but rather because the
election of a Black Republican meant-sooner or later-the abolition of slavery
in the South. Out of the Union they might have a chance to keep their peculiar
institution; in it they saw none.
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